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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district cou~i'sOrder Granting Defendants' Motioil for Summary
li~dginent. Appellant William Lightner is an Idaho state prisoner. Appellant Marcia Lightner is his
wife. The Lightners filed this actiou pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, alleging that their constitutioi~al
rights were violated when Idaho Department of Correction ("DOC") officials terminated Mrs.
Lightner's visiting privileges
B. Procedural History
The Lightners initially filed their Civil Rights Coinplaint on January 14, 2008. (R., p. 7).
Responde~ltsfiled an Answer and Jury De~nandon February 5,2008. (R., p. 21). On June 12,
2008, the district coiirt granted the Lightners' request to anleild their Complaint. (See R., p. 3).
The Lightners then filed their Amended Civil Rights Colnplaiilt 011June 16, 2008. (R., p. 31).
The primary pui-pose of the ainendnle~ltwas to disiniss Defendants Blades, I<irltma~~,
McIntire,
Amersfoot, and Greenland; while adding Defendant Reieinl. (Conzpare R., p. 7 and p. 31; see

also Motion to Arnend Civil Rights Comnplaint, filed April 21, 2008 and anginenled to the record
piirsLlallt to the Court's J~ily30, 2009 Order Granting Molioit to Augnlent the Record). On July
I , 2008, Respondents filed their Answer to Arneilded Complaint and Jury Demand. (R., p. 44).
011November

21, 2008, the Respondents filed their inotioli for summary judgment, along

with supporting affidavits. (See R., p. 5; Exs. 1-4). The Lightners then filed a response to the
sunlmary judgment nlotioll, wllicl~was followed by a reply fiom the Respondents. (R., p. 54;
Ex. 7). The district co~11.1
held a hearing on December 22,2008. (Tr., pp. 32-78). On January

29, 2009, the district court issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgnient. (R., p. 71). The Lightners filed a nlotion for reconsideration on February 12, 2009,
which was denied by the district court 011March 13, 2009. (See July 30, 2009 Order Granting
Motion to A~ignientthe Record, items 4-7). 111 tlze interim, the Lightners filed a Notice of
Appeal on March 11, 2009. (R., p. 84). This was followed by an Aniended Notice of Appeal,
filed on March 23, 2009. (R., p. 103).
C. Statement of Facts

William Lightner is an Idaho state prisoner in the c ~ ~ s t o of
d ythe Idaho Department of
Cot-rection ("IDOC"). (R., p. 32,1/ 1; Ex.4, Ex.D thereto). At ail times relevant to this action
he was incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution ("ISCI"). (Id.) The details of
William Lightner's criminal history and current crime of convictio~~
are detailed in Lightizev v.
State, 142 Idaho 324, 127 P.3d 227 (Ct. App. 2005). Williain Lightner is inarried to Marcia
Lightner. (R., p. 33,li 10).
In 2005, William Lightner was placed on parole. (R., Ex.4 , 1 6 ; and Ex.D thereto). He
subsequently absconded supervision and fled to Belize. (R., Ex.4,1/ 6). Upon his return to
IDOC custody, Mr. Liglltner was housed at ISCI fioin October 27, 2005 until May I , 2008, when
he was transfel-red to the Idaho Correctional Center ("ICC"). (R., Ex.4, Ex.D thereto).

On April 10, 2007, Marcia Lightner was arrested on felony charges for harboring a felon,
in violation of Idaho Code 9 18-205. (R., p. 3 3 , 7 11; Ex.3, Ex.A thereto). As a result of Mrs.
Lightnel-'s arrest, Randy Blades, tlie ISCI warden at tlie time, teriiiiiiated her visiting privileges.
(R., p. 33,B 12; Ex. 4, 1 7). Defendant Steve Nelson did not participate in the decision to

tel-minate Mrs. Liglllner's visiting privileges. (R., Ex. 4,1/ 12, Ex. G thereto (# 000016); Ex. 3,
Ex. B illereto (Interrogalory No. 1)). In July 2007, Warden Blades reinstated Mrs. Lightner's
visiting privileges. (R., Ex. 4,1/ 7). In August 2007, Warden Hardison replaced Warden Blades
at ISCI. ( l r i )

On October 1 , 2007, Warden Hardison ter~ilinatedMrs. Lightner's visiting privileges
based on her previous arrest and unresolved criminal charges. (R., Ex. 4 , 7 8). The Lightners
visiting privileges were also ternlinated based on William Lightner's history of absconding the
country while oil parole, aloiig with a variety of past visiting issues involvillg the Lightners. (Id.,

7

8 9 ) Defendant Steve Nelson did not participate in the decision to teiminate Mrs. Lightner's

visiting privileges. (

12

The Lightners were both given 11oticeof Warden Hardison's

decision oti October I , 2007. (Ill., 1 8).
The lDOC has a prison grievance process. (R., Ex. 2, Exs. A-C thereto). William
Lightner failed to exhaust the grievance process relating lo visitation issues prior to filing this
lawsuit. (R., Ex. 2, 11 13).
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAI,

The Lightners identify four issues on appeal. Appellants ' BsieJ p. 5. Respondents restate
those issues as follows:
I ) Did the district court err in disnlissing Willian~Lightner's claims based on his failure

to exhaust the IDOC grievance process?
2) Did the termination of the 1,ightners' visiting privileges violate their constitutional
rights?

3) Did the district court err in disinissiilg Marcia Lightner's loss of consorti~~m
claim?

4) Did the Lightncrs fail to preserve their retaliation and double jeopardy claims on
appeal?
111. STANDARD O F REVIEW ON APPEAL

As recently explained by the Idalio Supreme Court in Citibn~zlc(South Dalcotn), NA. v.

"

Ccc/.~-oll,
2009 W L 4067870, 2 (Nov. 25, 2009):

When reviewing the grant of a niotion for summary judgment, this Court applies
the same standard used by the district court in ruling 011 the motion. Van v.
Portri,ez$Mecl. Cir., 147 Idalio 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). "Summary
judgment is properly granted w l i e ~'the
~ pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no ge~luiiieissue as to
any ~ilaterialfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."' Icl. (quoting Idalio R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The burden of demonstrating the
absence of a g e n ~ ~ i nissue
e of niaterial fact is on the inoving party. Icl. This Court
must corrstrue the record in favor of tlie nonlnoving party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Icl. If a court finds that reasonable minds could
differ on co~iclusioilsdrawn fiom the evidence presented, tlie motion must be
denied. Icl. However, the nonmoving party must respond to the lvotion with facts
that specifically show there is an issue for trial; the showing of a mere scintilla of
evidence will be insufficient to meet that burden. Id. The denial of a motion for
reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 560, 212 P.3d at 990.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The district court properlv dismissed William Lightner's claims based on his failure to

exl~austthe IDOC erievance process.
1 . Prisorz Litigatiorz Rcjor111Act

The Ligl~tnersbrought this action under 42 U.S.C.

9 1983.

(R., p. 33). Pursuant to the

Prison Litigation Refonu Act ("PLRA"), "[n]o action sliall be b r o ~ ~ g\vith
l ~ t respect to prison
conditions ~ ~ n dsection
er
1983 ofthis title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

ally jail, prison, or other coi~ectionalfacility until such administrative remedies as are available
are eslia~tsted."42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Ili forlei 11.N~lssle,534 U.S. 516 (2002), the United
requiremellt applies to all
States Supreme Court expressly stated that "the PLRA's exha~~stion
inmate suits about prison life, whetlier they involve general circu~nstancesor particular episodes,
and wheilier tliey allege excessive force or some other wro11g." Id. at 532. The S ~ ~ p r e l Court
ne

lias also lleld that where an inmate seelts money damages for a prison conditions claim, he or she
must complete the prison adtnillistrative process for the claims, eve11 if the process does not
provide for money damages. Booth v. Clmrizer, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). The prison administrative
process is sufficient if it "could provide some sort of relief 011 the complaint." Id. at 734.
An inmate mrrst exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit; exhallstion

cannot be accomplished d ~ ~ r i na gsuit or after a suit has been filed. See McKinney v, Cclreji, 31 1
F.3d 1 198 (9"' Cir. 2002) (suit disillissed without prejr~dicewhere prisoner attempted to exhaust
administrative remedies during pendency of suit.) "A stay of the suit pending exhaustion does
iiot satisfy the plain language of t l ~ estatute." Mubar-ak v. Cc~lifomiaDept, of Corrections, 315 F.
Supp.2d 1057, I060 (S.D. Cal. 2004). Additionally, "[a] grievance obviously cannot exhaust
administrative relnedies for clainls based 011events that have not yet occurred. Nor does a
grievance exha~lstadministrative remedies for all future complaints of the same general type."
Ross

11.

Cozriit)~ofBei~iialillo,365 F.3d 1181, 1188 (loL1'Cir. 2004).

In two recent cases, tile United States S ~ ~ p r e mCot11-t
e clarified the lna~ldatorynature of the
PI.RA's exliaustion requirement. 111ljVOocIjo~clii.Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), the Supreme Court
Ireiterated that propel-exhaustion of the grievance process is required under the PLRA. As explained

by the COLI?:"The benefits to exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is
given a fair oppo~?unityto consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not have such
a11oppo~tunity~lnlessthe grievant complies with the systenl's c~iticalprocedural rules." Id. at 95.
The Supren~eCourt specifically rejected any notio~lthat prisoners get to decide whether or not to
follow Lhe grievance process.
For example, a prisoner wishing to bypass the available administrative remedies
could sin~plyfile a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file
on time. If the prison then rejects the grievance as untimely, the prisoner could
proceed directly to federal C O L I I ~...We are confident that the PLRA did not create
s ~ ~ cal tootl~less
l
scheme.

In Jones

11.

Boclc, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), the Supreme Court addressed several issues.

Specifically, the Court reemphasized that "[tlhere is no question that exhanstion is mandatory
~ ~ n dthe
e r PLRA and that unexhausted claiins cannot be brought." Id at 21 1 (citing Povtev v.
Nzls.sle, 534 U.S. at 524). The Court also confirined "that failure to exhaust is an affinnative
defense under the PLRA." Joizes, 549 U.S. at 216. (See R., pp. 28, 50). The Supreme Court
further clarified that "[tlhe level of detail necessary in a grievance to compIy with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and ciain1 to claim, but it is the prison's
renuirements, and not Lhe PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones, 549

U.S.at 218 (enlphasis added). As explained below, because Willia~nLightner failed to comply
with the PLRA's exhailstion requirement, the district court properly disinissed his claims.

I n addition to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the Ida110 Habeas Corpus and
Institutional Litigation Procedures Act (the "Act"), Idaho Code $ 19-4201, el seq., also requires
requirelneilt is set forth in Idaho Code 5
administrative exhaustion. 111 particular the exha~~stion
19-4206, whicii states:
( I ) Unless a petitioner who is a prisoner establishes to tile satisfaction of the court
that lie is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, 110 petition for writ of
habeas colpus or any other civil action sliall be bro~iglitby any person
confined in a state or county institution, or in a state, local or private
con.ectional facility, with respect to conditions of confinenlent t~ntilall
available adlninistrative reniedies have been exhausted. If tlie institution does
not have a systeni for adlninistrative remedy, this reqi~ire~nent
shall be
waived.
(2) At the time of filing, the petitioner shall submit, together with the petition for
writ of habeas corpus a true, correct and co~npletecopy of any docu~nentation
which demonstrates that he has exhai~stedadnlinistrative remedies described
in s~ibsection(1)
~,of this section.
(3) If at [he time of filing the petitio~lfor writ of habeas coipus the petitioner fails
to C O I ~ I.P I.~ w~ththis sectlon, the court shall dismiss the petition wit11 or
witho~itprejudice.
(empliasis added). As clearly stated by this section, a prisoner in any civil action is required to
exllal~slall of his available adniinistrative re~i~edies
before filing the action. Dreizizon. v. Idc~lzo
Siciie C'orl.ecrioi~ciil~lsr.,145 Idaho 598, 603, 181 P.3d 524, 529 (2007). Failure to f~~lfill
the
exhaustion requirement inandates dismissal.

3. The ZDOC GTier~flnce
Process
The IDOC has an administrative grievance system available to all inmates. This system
has been in effect at all times relevant to this action. The details of the IDOC grievance system

are set forth in the Affidavit of Jill Whittington (including exhibits) (R., Ex. 2). That process is
si~mmilrizedas follows:
The IDOC grievance process is a tlxee-step process. An iiunate lnust co~npletea11 tlvee
steps in order to exhaust the admiliistrative grieva~iceprocess. The first step in the process
requires the inlnate to attempt to resolve the issue inlbrrnally by submitting a "concern fonn." If
tlie i s s ~ ~is enot resolved infomally, the inmate can proceed to the second step, which is
submitting a grievance fonn.
The grievance form is reviewed by the grievance coordinator to malte sure it is properly
co~~?pleted.
The grievance coordinator then logs the grievance and provides the grievance form
io [lie most appropriate staff inember, other than tlie one who responded to the concern fonn, for
a response. The staff member's respoiise is then forwarded to the reviewing autliority, usually a

deputy warden, for review and decision. At this point the grievance form containing the
I-esi~onses
of tlie staff member and reviewing authority are logged and returned to the inmate.
I f the inmate is unsatisfied with the reviewing a~~thority's
decision, he may proceed to tlie

third siep by filing a grievance appeal. The grievance appeal is logged and forwarded to the
appellate authority, usually the warden, for a final decision. The grievance policy also provides
that "[t]he appellate a~~tl~ority
may certify the grie~iaaceto the Director or other Division
AtIn1inist1-atorwlieli iii the opinion of the appellate authority the resolution to the grievance is
beyond the appellate authority's control." (R., Ex. 2, Exs. A-C tllaeto, pp. 4,7, mid 12,
respectively). The grievance form, including the appellate a~itliority'sresponse, is then returned
to h e inmate, completing the grievance process.

4. Discnssiorz

Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges were suspended on October I , 2007. (R., p. 33,7
I 4).Pursuant to tlie IDOC grievance policy in effect at tlie time, William Lightner had fifteen

days to file a grievance. (R., Ex. 2, Ex. B thereto, p. 5).' Even assuming that Willialu Lightner
was granted an extension of time to file a grievance, he was still required to exhaust the
gl-ievancc process before filing this action. In other words, Willia~nLightner was required to
exhaust the grievance process no later than January 14, 2008. As established by the record,
any grievances relating to visitation issues at any tilne during
William Lightner failed to s~~bliii[
2007 through January 2008. (R., Ex. 2 , 7 13). Because William Lightner failed to submit any
grievances, let alone exhaltst the grievance process, his claims were properly dismissed by the
district court
The Lightners argue that William's claiins are not barred due to his failure to exl~austthe

IDOC $1-ictalici: pi.occss, instead, they contend that he was not required to exhaust the grievance
process because there was no procedure for him to challenge Warden Hardison's decision
lcriiiinaiiiig Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges. hl other words, because Warden Hardison was
the "appellate ai~tllority"under the grievance process, and he had already made the decision to
terminate tlie Ligl~tners'visiting privileges, it was pointless to file a grievance. Lightners'
argLlment is witlloul tilerit for several reasons.

I

This timekame was s~ibsequentlyincreased to thirty days. (R., Ex. 2, Ex. C thereto, p. 5)

As a pl-eliminai-ymattet- it is interesting to note that in their Amended Civil Rights
Complaint, the Lightners aiirntativeiy allege that they "have exha~istedthe prison grievance
systein." (R., p. 4 2 , l 41). However, on appeal they contradict themselves by clainling that
Wiliia~nwas not required to exhaust the grievance process. See Wyatt v. Terlzune, 315 F.3d
1 108, 1 1 I9 (9"' Cir. 2003) ("In deciding a nlotion to dismiss for a failure to exha~lstllolljudicial

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.")
Turning to the s~~bstailce
of Lightnel-s' argument, there is nothing in the IDOC grievance
policy that prohibits an offender fro111 grieving a warden's decision. (See, R. Ex. 2). Although
the appellate authority is typically the warden, there is nothing in the grievance policy preventing
an orfender from filing a grievance regarding the warden. Any attempt by the Lightners to read
s~icha prohibition into the policy should be rejected. As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in
iVooc@rd v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 95 (2006): "The benefits to exhaustion can be realized orlly if the

prisoli grievai~cesystenl is given a fair oppol-tunity to consider the grievance. The prison
grievance system will not have such an oppo~-t~illity
ullless the grievant colnplies with the
systein's critical procedural rules." Because Mr. Lightner was not prohibited from filing a
grievance regal-ding Wal-den Hardison's decision, he was required to exhaust the grievance
process. It is also inlportant to recognize that "exhanstion allows prison officials an oppoltunity
to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into
cout~."Joiles

I),

Rock, 549 U.S. at 204 (2007). In this case, exhausting the grievance process

woi~ldhave given Warden Hardison the opportunity to reconsider his decision. Instead, Mr.
Lightner iinilatet.ally decided to bypass the grievance system. However, as explained by the

IJiiited Stales Supreme Court, prisoners are not entitled to make that decision. Wooclford, 548

U.S. al 95.
Additionally, lo ilie extent Warden Hardison may have liad some type of conflict of
interest due to heins hofli tile subject of the grievance and the appellate authority, the IDOC
grievance policy provided that: "The appellate authority may certify the grievance to tlie Direct01
01.otlier Division Adminislraior when in the opinion of tlie appellate authority the resolution to
the grievance is beyond tlie appellate authority's control." (R., Ex. 2, Exs. A-C thereto, pp. 4, 7,
and 12, respectively). Had Willialn Liglitner followed the grievance process, Warden Hardison
would liave liad ail opporti~nityto refer the matter to another authority if he deemed it necessary.
(Tr., p. 40, L. 21-p.

42, L. 5; p. 76, L. 11-p.

77, L. 15). However, rather than following the

grievance process as I-equired,Mr. Lightner decided to disregard the rules.
The Lightners also attempt to argue that William was told by a correctional officer that he
coiild iiot grieve a warden's decision. Ap/,ellnnts ' Bricj; p. 16. However, this asse~tioiiis based
OII

~~~;i~liiiissil~ic
Iic;~is;lyaiiil iacl<s roilndation. (TI.,
p. 75, Ls. 12-24). Instead, as properly

detel-mined by tlie district court, William Liglltner was familiar with tlie grievance process, but
si~nplyfailed to avail himself of it with regard to his clai~nsin this action. (R., pp. 74-75).

B. The termination o f the Lightners' visiting privileges did not violate anv o f their
constitutional rights.
The ii~~idan~eiital
claiin asserled by the Lightners is that the terlnination of Mrs. Lightner's
visiting privileges violated their constitutional lights. As established above, William Liglitner's

clainis are bar[-edas a result of his Cailure to exlia~~st
tile D O C grievance p r o c e ~ s .Therefore,
~
to the
extent that either of the Lightners nlay assertany claims in this lawsuit, Marcia Lightner would be
tlie only one allowed to proceed. However, as explained below, the denial of Marcia Lightner's
visitins pi-ivileges did not violate any of her constitutional rights.
As a preliminary matter, it is iiliportant to point out that the Ligiltners do not challenge
tlie district coiirt's decision dismissing Brent Reinlte and Steve Nelson. Rlzend v. Hartforcl Ins.
Co of the Micll,i~est,135 Idaho 446,452, 19 P.3d 760, 766 (2001) ("Tllis Court will not review
iss~tesnot presented in the statelnent of issues or argiled by either party in their briefs.") The
Liglitiicis did

i ~ u i.aisc
t
[lie dis~iiissal defendants

Reiillte and Nelson in their statement of

issues, nor did they present any argu~uentin their brief. Accordingly, the Liglitners have waived
any challenge to the disnlissal of these defendants. Therefore to the extent, any claim may
s~rvive,it woi~ldolily be against Warden Hardison. Unfortunately, Warden Hardisoii died on
May 3, 2009. (http://www.ler.acv.com/obituaries/idahostatesma~~/obiti~ary,aspx?n=iohn-phili~~i~lj~~~&l~id=l27017868).

Tluorrglroat this action and on appeal, the Light~lershave repeat.edly argued that they have a
liberty or property interest in visiting each other, thereby entitli~igthem to due process protections.
Wit11 (regard to tlie Ligirtners' due process claim, the district court explained:
Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause
itself and tlie laws of the States." KJJ.Dep 't oj'Cori~ectiorzsv. T l ~ o ~ ~ ~ p490
s o nU.S.
,
454. 460 (1 989) (quntiilg ife~vitlI? Xel/?zs, 459 U.S. 460 ( I 983)). "The D L I ~
Process Clause oftlie federal constitution does not, of its own force create a
2 Even if Willianl Lightner did exliaust the grievance process, or was excused from doing so, his

claims would still fail based 011 the salile reasons explained below.

liberty inlet-est...,for it is well settled that ail ililiiate does not have a liberty
interest in tlie denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends."
Block v. Ruthe~foforcl,
468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a
ordinarily colltelnpiated
particular visitor "is well within the tertns of confinenie~~t
by a prison sentence." Tl~onz~son,
490 U.S. at 461 (qzlotiizg Hewitt, 459 U.S. at
468).
However, state statutes or reg~llatiorlscan create a due process liberty interest
where none otherwise would have existed. Tlzonzpson, 490 U.S. at 461. For a
state law to create a liberty interest, it must contail1 "explicitly lila~~datory
language." Tlionzpson, 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472).

(R., pp. 77-78). This due process a~lalysiswas subseque~~tly
modified by the United
Statcs Supretile Cout-1 and followed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
111Scliei~ersv. Stcrle, 129 Idaho 573, 930 P.2d 603 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court
specifically adopted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sc~nclin1). Conner, 515 U.S
472 ( I 995). As recognized in Sckevefors,Snrzdbi clarified the standard for deteriniiiing when a
prisoiier has a prolecled liberty interest:
. . .we recognize that States inay under certain circumstances create liberty
interests whicli are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will
be genet-ally lilnited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
sentence ill S L I C a~11 ~iliexpectedmaliiier as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, rroiietheless imposes an atypical and significant
hardship on tlie inmate in relatioil to the ordinary incidents ofprison life.

Schevers, 930 P.2d at 606, cili~ingSr~ncliii1). Coniter, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (citations omitted).
As exj,lail~ed by the court in f4'are v. Momison, 276 F.3d 385, 388 (8"' Cir. 2002):
Olily sanctions that impose atypical and significant hardships upon a prisoner in
relation to the ordinary restraints and incidents of prison life iinplicate tlie Due
Process Cla~tse.Scmdirin. 515 U.S. at 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The suspe~~sion
of
Ware's visitatio~iprivileges wit11 respect to his wife and two other wolneil does
no1 impose ~tpoliWare ail atypical and sigiiificailt hardship. Accordiilgly, the
suspensio~iof'tliese visitation privileges without affording Ware a hearing would

11otiilfi.inge Ware's due-process rights even if in fact the warden had ordered the
for Ware's involveinent with his visitors in s~nuggli~lg
suspension as pitnish~~ient
forbidden goods illto the prison.

It is therefore clear that the terminatio~lof the Light~lers'visiting privileges did not
impose an atypical and significa~ithardship, and thus did not implicate due process
protecttons. Accord~ngly,the Lightt~erswere ilot ent~tledto due process

ill

coniiection

with tlie termination of their visiting privileges.
Furthennore, Idaho Board of Correctioll Rule 604: "Nothing i11Section 604 establishes a
right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604 should be interpreted as an expectation that
visitation will be approved between any person and any ininate if the Department has suspended,
tenuina~ed,or revolted a visitor or inmate's visiting privileges." D A P A 06.01.01.604.01.
Liltewise, Rule 604 states that "[i]nniate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head
or designee." (Icl.; R., pp. 78-79). Therefore, it is clear that the IDOC's visiting policy does not
cl-eate any due process right in visiting. To the contrary, the Board of Correction's rule expressly
dispels any such notion. Coilsistellt with this rule, the IDOC visiting policy provides:
Visiting privileges may be terminated at the discretion of the facility head or
designee for any length of time, i~icludiilgpermanently, for violati011or attempted
violation of any state or federal law, any Board rule, Policy and Procedure, SOP,
field memoranda, or failure to follow staff iilstructio~ls.

(I<., Ex. 4, Ex. C thereto, p. 6 ) (e~i~phasis
added). That policy further grants the facility head, i.e.,
wal-deli, tlie d1scretio11to deny visitation requests of family members with a felo~lyarrest within
the last five years. ( 1 , p 0 ) Mrs. Liglitner was arrested in April, 2007 on a felony charge for
hat-bol-ii-iga Celon. (R., Ex. 3, Ex. A thereto).

As explained by the United Slates Supreme Court, "[aln iiunate does not retain rights
inconsistent with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have established, freedoin of
association is among the rights least colnpatible with incarceration. Some curtailment of that
freedom must be expected in the prison context." Ol~ertonv. Bnzzettn, 539 U.S. 126, I31 (2003)

~ eOverton were several prison visitation restrictions. In
(citations omitted). At i s s ~ in
deiernlii?i~igwhether ihe various restrictions were constitutional, the Supreme Court held that the
bear a rational relation to legitimate
appropriate test was whet he^. "the challenged reg~~lations
penological interests." 539 U.S. at 132. However, the Court cautioned that "[wle must accord
substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a
significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for
ileicrmining the most appropriate n~eansto accompiisl~thein." Id The Court then decided that
whether visiting regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests requires an
application ofthe four-part test established by the Court in Turner v. SaJIey, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
As explained by the Court in Overton:
i n T1.1.rnerwe held that four factors are relevalit in deciding whether a prison
reg~ilatioilaffecting a constitutio~lalright that survives incarceration withstands
constitutional challenge: whetl~er the regulation has a "'valid, rational
connection"' to a legitinlate governmental interest; whether a l t e ~ ~ ~ a tmeans
i v e are
open to innlates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accon~~nodation
of
the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether
there are "ready alternatives" to the regnlation.

Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (citing T~~rrrer,
482 U.S. 78, 89-91). Applying the Turizer factors to the
visiiation restrictions at issue in Overton, the Supreme Court concluded that the restrictions were

constitutional, as they were rationally related to legitimate pellological interests. Overtor?,539
U.S. at 132. As explai~ledbelow, the same c o l ~ c l ~ ~ sisi ocolnpelled
l~
in the present case.
As a poini of clarification, it is importailt to recognize that regardless of the constitutional
source of Marcia Lightner's claims,' the Turner allalysis applies. "The status of a person as a
prisoner or non-prisoner does not deter~ninewlletl~erthe Tzirlrizer test applies to prison regulations
that 1nay affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kenzplzer, 374 F.3d 675, 681 (8"' Cir.
2004); Tlzon~bzcrglzv. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 11. 9 (1989) (rejecting "any attempt to forge
separate standards [apart from firmer] for cases implicating the rights of outsiders.") In
Overton, the visiting regulations were cilalienged by both prisoners and their non-prisoner
visitors, who asserted violations of their First, Eighth, and Fourteentl~Amendment rights. In
analyzing tl~eseclaims, the Supreme Court applied the Tzimer test without distinction. Overton,
539 U.S. at 131-32. As explained more recently in Von Minden v. Jankowski, 2007 WL 1958615
(W.D. Tex. 2007), "regardless of whether the Plaintiffs rely on the Fourteentl~(due process or

equal protection clauses) or First Anendnle~ltin this case, the Court will apply the same test to
detelinitle whether the Visitation Policy is constitutional: whether the Visitation Policy is
'reasonably related to legitimate pellological iilterests'." Id., at * 8 (citing Turner v. Snfley, 482
U.S. 7 8 , 89).
As indicated above, the first Turner factor requires a detellnination of whether the
chailellged restriction is ratiollally related to a legitiinate pellological interest. 111 this case, the

'

For example, Mrs. Lightner asserts violatioi~sof the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendn~ents,along wit11 the Idaho Constilution. (R., p 35, 71 15).

iegilimate penological interest in support of Warden Hardisoil's decisioii to deny Marcia
Lightner's visiting privileges was protecting the sec~~rity
of the i~istitutioi~
and preveilting
disruption in the visiting area. (R., Ex. 4,a 8). I11 Overiorz, the Supreme Court stated that
maintaining internal prison security was "perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals." 539

U.S. at 133. As explained by the district court, "MarciaLiglitner was arrested for the feloliy
offense of harbori~iga Lelon in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-205." (R., p. 72). Likewise, the
district court fo~iiidthat "[tlhe Lighlners have a history of violati~igfacility policies." (R., p. 72).
Some examples include inappropriate colttact with each other, inappropriate clothing,
intel-ference wit11 other visitors, improper use of a parking space, aiid hostility toward staff. (R.,
pp. 72-73). As fo~llidby the district court:
Preveilti~lgan iil~natefrom visiting with someone accused of harboring a f ~ ~ g i t i v e
serves the legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the
institution. Preventing visits which habitually create a disturbance serves the
legitimate penological ptrlpose of nlilli~~sizi~lg
disruption in the visiting area. The
COLII?
finds that Warden Hardisoil was acting with the pe~lologicalpurpose to
preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operatioil of the facility.

(R., p. 79).
Throughout the Aliiended Co~iiplaiiit,Mrs. Lightner repeatedly contends that termillation
of her visiting privileges was improper because she had not yet been convicted of a crime. (See
R

.

13.

37). Howevel., this is a distinction without a difference. As explained by the court in Von

The fact that Plailitiffs were pretrial detainees who had not been convicted of ally
crimes at the ti111e they were denied visitation privileges does not mean that they
were 1101 a seci~rityi.isIc. As the Supreine Court has stated, "[tlhere is 110 basis for
coiicludi~igthat pretrial detainees pose ally lesser security risk than co~ivicted

inina~es"and "[ilndeed, it may be that in certain circ~~n~stances
they present a
greater risk to jail security and order," includi~~g
"a greater risk of escape than
other inmates."
lioi7

Minde11, 2007 W L 1958615, " 9 (2007) (quoting Bell

IJ.

WolJsiz, 441 U.S. 520,547 11. 28

( 7 9 ) ) In the present case, Marcia Lightner's arrest was for harboring a convicted felo~lwho
had escaped from IDOC custody. This fact, combined with Willianl Lightiler's prior attempt to
flee supervision by leaving the country only emphasizes the security risk the Lightners presented.
Accordingly, visitation restrictions based a visitor's crilninal history (including arrests) are
rationally related to the legitinlate penological goals of maintaining the safe, secure, and orderly
operation of the prison; atid preventing future crime. Therefore, the termination of Marcia
Lightner's visitation privileges satisfies the first Turner factor.
The second Tunier factor asks whether there are alternative means for exercising the
asserted right. As explained by Warden Hardison, the Lightners still had the availability to
communicate wit11 each other through letters, telephone calls, and through other visitors. (R., Ex.
4 , 1 0 I11 Overtorz, the Coui-t held that alternative forms of colninunication such as letters and
lelephone calls were sufficient. 539 U.S. 126, 135. The district coul-t found that these same
alternative forms of conlrn~~~~icatio~l
were available to the Lightners and had been found to be
sufficient by the Silprenle Court in Overton. (R., p. 80). The Court explained in Overton that
"jajlkrnaiives io visilalio11 need not be ideal, however; they need only be available." 539 U.S. at
139. Based on this reasoning, there is no basis for reaching a different co~lclusionin the present
case.

TIic tliii-d T L I I . I [actor
I ~ I . req~iiresali inquiry in to the impact that accommodating the
Lighiners visits would have on prison resources. As explained by Warden Hardison, allowi~lg
sonle f o ~ mof closely mo~litored,non-contact visits was not practical, based on li~nitedspace
availability and because it would require the c o ~ n ~ n i t m eo~f iat staff lnember to be posted near the
Liglltners during their visits. (R., Ex. 4, 11

ould inlpose more than a

de il~iriiniiscost on ISCI resources because it would esse~ltiallyprevent that staff member fiom

perfoiiuing otiier functions or being in another location during the visits. (Id.) This would also
redilce the ability of other offenders to have visits. With respect to this factor, the district court
Eotind that "even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaiiltiffs, the evidence shows
that an attempt to accon~niodatethe Lightners could have been unreasonably time co~isumi~lg
ii~ldb~~rdensorne
on ihe facility and the other i~~lnates."
(R., p. 80). Eve11assuming that allowing
the Lightners to visit each other would not impose more tha11 a than a cle nziizinzis cost on ISCI
resources, thal does not nlean that the restriction is invalid. Miclier~elclerv. Stlniiier, 860 F.2d
328, 331 11. 1 (9'" Cir. 1988) ("Not all four factors will be relevant to each case.") Furthe~~nore,
Lhe Supreme Court has cautioiled that courts should be " 'particularly deferential' " to prison
adiiiinistrators' j ~ ~ d g ~ n eregarding
nts
this determination. Overton, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (citing
T~.rrilci.,
482 U.S. 78, 90).

The last Tzrr17e1.factor aslts ''\\/Iiether the presence of ready alternatives undermines the
i.easonableness of the reg~tlations." Overton, 539 U.S. at 136. As explained by the Court,
"Tzc~vierdoes not impose a least-restrictive-altel~lativetest, but asla instead whether tile prisoner

has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully acco~nmodatesthe asserted right

while not imposing Inore than a cle niii7ii?ziscost to the valid penological goal." Icl. This factor is
above. See Wii-schiiig v. Coloraclo, 360
closely linked with the third Turner factor, disc~~ssed
F.3d 1191, 1201 (1 0''' Cir. 2004) (analyzing third and fourth Turner factors together). With
respect to this factor, courts sho~ildagain "accord substantial deference to the professional
ji~clgmentof prison adininistrators in defining the legitinlate goals of a coi~ectionssystem and
cleternlining tile most appropriate means to accon~plishtheill." Doe v. Donahue, 829 N.E.2d 99,
l I 0 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Overton, 539 U.S. at 132). Based on the reasons explained

above, there were no ready altelllatives to the visitation restriction imposed by Wardell Hardison.
With respect to this point, the district court concluded that "Plaintiffs have provided no such
alternative nor does one seem to exist within the limited resources of the IDOC." (R., p. 80).
~
existed, that alorle wot~ldnot be enough to overcolne the
Even assunling S L I C alternatives

legitimate penological pulpose served by the restriction, particularly wile11appropriate deference
is given to the prison administrators' judgment.
As a resi~ltof the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the tennination of Marcia Lightner's
visiting privileges was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest, and therefore did not
violate any of her alleged constitutional rights. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
granting summary judg~nentin favor of the Respondents.
Altenlatively, tlie district court properly determined that Warden Hardison was entitled to
qualified immi~nityiregarding his decisioll to terminate the Light~~ers'
visiting privileges. (R.,
pp.
80-81). The Lightners do not cllallenge this decision 011appeal, and have therefore waived the
issiie. See Rheud v, I f ~ ~ r ~ o r d Co.
I ~ i ofthe
s . Miclwest, 135 Idaho 446, 452.

C. The district court did not err in dismissing Marcia Lightner's Ioss of consortium claim.
Tiic Iigiitiicrs co~itciidthat the iermination of their visitiiig privileges resulted in a loss of
consortium. (R. pp. 35-38) "'The clai~iifor loss of consortium is a wliolly derivative cause of
action contingent Lipon a third party's tot-tious i11.jury to a spouse.' . .. A loss of consortium claim
is necessarily depe~identup011the iiijured spouse's success or failure in the uiiderlyilig claim
against the third party." Zc~lehctv. Rosholt, Robertson & Tztclcer, Cl?tcl.,131 Idalio 254, 256, 953
P.2d I363 (1 998) (quoting Runcorn v. Shearer Lunzber Procls., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 394, 690
P.2d 324 (1 984)). In the present case William Liglitiier failed to e x h a ~ ~the
s t grievance process,
and therefore is barred fro111pursuing any claims. Because Marcia Lightner's loss of colisortiuin
ciai~nis contingent upon the success of Willia111Lightner's claim, it is also barred. 111other
words, because William Lightner's underlying claims are barred by his failure to exhaust the
~i'ii.\-i~iicc:
pl-ocess, lie has no chance of stlccess 011 those claims. Consequently, Marcia
Lightner's loss of consoi-tiuiii clainl is also barred. Ful-thelmore, "COLII-~S have allnost
i ~ n a n i ~ i ~ odenied
~ ~ s l yderivative Ioss of consortium clai~nsbased on the violatioil of the spouse's
civil rights." Jereminh

11.

Ynnlce Machine Sliap, Irzc., 131 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992 (1998)

(denying loss of consorti~~ln
claim in actioii for violatioli of Idalio Human Rights Act). The
district court properly applied the foregoiilg authority in this case when it concluded that "[elven
irM1-.Lightner's claim were iiot barred by his failure to exliai~stadlninistrative remedies and if
that claiin were to have succeeded, a loss of consortiu~iiclaiin based up011 alleged violation of
civil rights rails as a matter of law." (R., p. 82).

D. The Ligl~tnersfailed to preserve their retaliation and double ieopardy claims on appeal.
Tlte Lightners conteild that the district court failed to nile on their retaliation and double
pp. 33, 41. Before an appellal~tmay assert a11 issue on
jeopardy claims. Appellc~i~ts'BrieJ
appeal, lie must obtain ail adverse ruling 01.1 that issue fro111 tlie trial court. State v. Fisher, 123
Idaho 48 I, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) ("We will not review a trial court's alleged error oil
appeal inl less tlie record discloses an adverse r~~liizg
which fo~nlsthe basis for the assigunent of
error."); Slaie v. Hesler, 1 14 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27 (1 988) (Idaho Supreme Court wotild not
I-eviewciaini wliere appellant liad not obtained ruling fsorn trial court); State v. Kellji, 106 Ida110
3 0 8 ~276-77. 678 P.Zd 60, 68-69 (CL.App. 1984) (failure to obtain a nzling on an issue below

prevents appellate review abseut showiug of fuiidamental error). Because the Lightners failed to
obtain an adverse ruling from the district court on these claims, they bave not been preserved for
appeal.
Even if ihe Ligl~tiiers]>adproperly preserved these claims on appeal, they would
nonetheless be subject to dismissal. With respect to the Lightners' retaliation claim they co~lteild
tl~i!l tile tem?ii,ation of their visiting privileges was another act in a sequence of retaliatory

actious taken against tlzem over the past twelve y e a s by IDOC officials. See Appellants' BrieA
pp. 31 -38. A retaliation claiin IIILIS~allege the following: "(1) Au assertion that a state actor took
sonie adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and
that such action (4) hamled tlie prisoner and (5) was not rial-rowly tailored to advance a
legitimate correctioiiai goal." Rhocles v. Robinson, 380 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9"' Cis. 2004).

In iiiis case, there are no facts in tile record to suppori a retaliation claim. Instead,

tl?roughout their brief, the Liglit~iersrefer to alleged facts and events that are not properly in the
record and should not be considered by the Court. Additionally, the Lightners' factual
allegations lacic foundation, are speciilative, and consist of hearsay. As s~ich,their factrial
allegations are insufficient to prevent summary judgineiit. FurtIie17nore, there is 110 evidence in
the record that Warden Hardison's decision was based on ally retaliatory motive. Instead, as
pi-operly detemiined by the districi court, Warden Hardison's decisioii was in f~utlieranceof a
legitinlate pe~iologicalpurpose. Finally, tlie district court dete~lniliedthat Wardeli Hardison was
entitled to q~ialifiediiiimunity. (R., pp. 80-81). Tlie Lightners have not challenged that decision
on appeal. Based on these reasons, tlie Lightners' retaliation claim is without merit.
With regard to the Lightners' dortble jeopardy claim, they contend that because their

visiting privileges had been previously suspended, it was a violatio~iof double jeopardy to
telininate their privileges a second time. Appellaizts'BrieJ pp. 39-40. "The Double Jeopardy
Ciause of the Fifth Aii~endmentprovides that 'no person shall be . . . subject for the same offense
iu

hi: I\.\ icc piii

ill

jcopiil-dy of lifc 01-liilib.' This c l a ~ ~protects
se
against a second prosecutioli for

the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, aiid
111~11iiple
pi~nisllrnentsfor the saille offense." Gibsoiz v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 276, 108 P.3d
41 7, 423 (Ci. App. 2005) (citelions omitted); (Tr., p. 75, Ls. 4-1 1). It is undisputed that the
le~n~inalion
or the Lightners' visiting privileges did not constitute a second prosecution after
acq~~ittal
or conviction, nor did it impose inultiple punishmei~ts.Instead, tlie telmination was the

resi~ltof a discretionary administrative decision. As such, Lightners' double jeopardy claim fails
as a lliatter of law
V. CONCLUSION

Based

011

the foregoing reasons, the Respondents ~.espectf~~lly
request that the Court

affir~nthe d~striclcourt's order granting su~ninaryjudgment in their favor
Respectflilly s~~binitted
this ____

of December, 2009.
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